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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to extend the research on the Malaysian initial public offering (IPO)
management earnings forecasts by examining the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and
earnings forecasts accuracy. It seeks to investigate whether effective corporate governance is a credible
signal of improving the quality of financial information.
Design/methodology/approach – A sample of 235 IPO companies that went public during the
period 1999-2006 was used. Absolute forecast error was used to proxy for earnings forecast accuracy
and to represent financial disclosure quality.
Findings – Companies with a higher percentage of non-executive directors in the audit committees
and larger audit committee size exhibit greater forecast accuracy. The accuracy of IPO earnings
forecast is also positively influenced by the use of brand-name auditor.
Practical implications – The results suggest that effective corporate governance is a credible signal
of improving the quality of financial information. The role of audit committee as financial monitors as
suggested by the agency theory supports this paper.
Originality/value – The results are consistent with the belief that effective corporate governance is
associated with higher financial disclosure quality. The results also support the decisions made by
Malaysian regulators such as the Securities Commission to enhance the quality of financial disclosure
by revising the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance to encourage public companies to implement
good governance practices such as audit committee independence.
Keywords Managers, Earnings, Forecasting, Corporate governance, Malaysia
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Transparent financial disclosure minimises agency problems by reducing the asymmetry
of information between management and shareholders. On the other hand, poor financial
disclosure may deceive shareholders leading to unfavourable effects on their wealth.
Recent high-profile corporate failures have heightened global awareness of the importance
of corporate transparency and accountability. In response to this, the Malaysian Securities
Commission (SC) focused on corporate boards as the crucial means for improving the
quality of financial information provided by listed companies. In addition, financial
reporting practices can also be monitored by having effective board audit committees.
This paper examines whether effective corporate governance is associated with higher
financial disclosure quality, proxied by the accuracy of management earnings forecasts
disclosed in initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses[1].
The widespread failure of Malaysian IPO companies to achieve their earnings
forecasts is a major concern for capital market regulators as this reflects badly on the
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quality of companies that go public. The SC revealed that out of 57 companies that were
newly listed in 2005 and had announced audited results by July 2006, 32 companies had
fallen short of their earnings forecasts (The EdgeMalaysia, 2006). In addition, more than
half of these optimistic earnings forecasts showed deviations exceeding 20 per cent (New
Straits Times, 2006).
A Revised Code on Corporate Governance, effective from 1 October 2007, was
released by the SC and replaces the existing regulations issued in March 2000. The code
aims to strengthen the roles and responsibilities of the boards of directors and audit
committees to ensure that they discharge their roles and responsibilities effectively.
Under the Revised Code on Corporate Governance (SC, 2007), independent non-executive
directors (INEDs) should continue to make up at least one-third of the members of
a board to ensure that the board provides an independent oversight function. The
Revised Code also strengthens regulations on the independence and competence of audit
committees by excluding executive directors from membership and requiring all audit
committee members to be financially literate with at least one of them being a member of
an accounting association or body.
These regulatory reforms, presuppose that corporate governance structures, as
expressed by corporate boards and audit committees, affect the quality of financial
disclosure practices. Given that the disclosure of management earnings forecasts in the
IPO prospectus is mandatory for companies seeking a listing on the Main Board and on
the Second Boards of the Malaysian Stock Exchange (i.e. Bursa Malaysia) as a means of
reducing information asymmetry between management and potential investors, the
credibility of these earnings forecasts is paramount. Although extensive studies have
been undertaken on management earnings forecasts for IPO companies, the relationship
between corporate governance and mandatory disclosure of earnings forecasts has not
been thoroughly examined. The accuracy of management earnings forecasts is an
important factor in building and maintaining investors’ confidence about the credibility
of such financial disclosures.
This paper contributes to the corporate governance and IPO literature. This is the
first comprehensive study that examines the impact of governance mechanisms on
mandatory IPO earnings forecasts in Malaysia. Prior studies on management earnings
forecasts using Malaysian data ( Jelic et al., 1998; Ismail and Weetman, 2007), focused on
factors unrelated to corporate governance such as company age, earnings reduction
prior to IPO, type of industry, and economic condition. None of them fully addressed the
effect of corporate boards and audit committees on the accuracy of management
earnings forecasts.
Using a sample of 235 IPO companies during the periods 1999-2006, we find that
audit committees with non-executive directors (NEDs), and audit committee size, have a
negative association with the absolute forecast error (AFE) (that is to say, a positive
association with forecast accuracy). Our results indicate that the greater the proportion
of NEDs in the audit committee and the larger the audit committee size, the more
accurate the forecast made by the management of IPO companies. However, we do not
find any significant relationships between board characteristics and AFEs. The results
of our paper provide a degree of support for recent efforts by the SC to regulate the
structure of corporate boards and audit committees to ensure the quality of financial
disclosure. We also find that IPO company size has a positive relationship with the AFE.
This result suggests that IPO earnings forecasts are less credible for larger companies.
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of literature and
develops our research proposition. The methods are discussed in Section 3, while the
sample selection and data sources are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 reports the results
of our study and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review and research proposition
There is ample literature on the effects of corporate boards on earnings management and
earnings quality (Klein, 2002; Lobo and Zhou, 2006), on level and structure of executive
compensation (Core et al., 1999; Anderson and Bizjak, 2003) and on company performance
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Chen et al., 2007). The effect of corporate boards on disclosure
quality is not extensively examined in the literature with the exceptions of Karamanou and
Vafeas (2005) in the USA, Beekes and Brown (2006) in Australia, Cheng and Courtenay
(2006) in Singapore, Chin et al. (2006) in Taiwan and Bedard et al. (2008) in Canada.
Beasley (1996) and Klein (2002) suggest that outside directors provide a higher
quality of board oversight. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) show that companies with
a higher proportion of independent directors, or with independent directors being the
majority on the boards, have higher levels of voluntary disclosure. This suggests that a
board’s degree of independence is directly related to higher financial disclosure quality.
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) examine management forecasts as a proxy for
disclosure quality for a sample of 275 Fortune 500 companies in the USA during the
period 1995-2000. They find that the percentage of outside directors is directly related to
greater forecast accuracy, measured by the absolute value of the forecast error.
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) also test the association between ownership structure and
forecast accuracy, and find higher insider ownership leads to less-credible management
forecasts. Similar inverse relationship for ownership structure is also found by Chin et al.
(2006) using a sample of 528 Taiwanese-listed companies from 1999 to 2001. Chin et al.
(2006) suggest that companies tend to issue more inaccurate forecasts in instances of
greater divergence between the ultimate owner’s control and the equity ownership level.
Beekes and Brown (2006) examine the relationship between corporate governance
index and various indicators of disclosure quality, including the accuracy, bias and level
of disagreement in analysts’ earnings forecasts. They find that the disclosures by
better-governed companies are more informative. Another board characteristic that is
possibly related to disclosure quality is board size. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005)
suggest that board size is likely to be related to monitoring diligence. They argue that
adding more people to the board enhances its knowledge base. However, the dark side
of larger boards is less flexibility and more inefficiency. Their evidence shows that board
size has no relationship with the accuracy of management earnings forecast. Similarly,
Bedard et al. (2008) find that board of directors characteristics such as board size, board
independence and CEO duality are not significantly related to the credibility of
management earnings forecasts.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the effectiveness of audit committees in monitoring
the financial reporting process has become one of the most significant themes in
corporate governance debates (Gendron and Bedard, 2006). There are several empirical
studies that examine the characteristics of audit committee and identify those that
enhance the quality of financial reporting (Klein, 2002; Felo et al., 2003; Xie et al., 2003;
Abbott et al., 2004; Bedard et al., 2004; Krishnan, 2005; Persons, 2005; Lin et al., 2006;
Qin, 2007; Zhang et al., 2007). The quality of financial reporting is proxied by incidence of
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fraud or restatements, extent of earnings management, disclosure quality or internal
control weaknesses, among well-established listed companies. Our study extends
the literature regarding the effects of audit committee characteristics on disclosure
quality by examining a sample of newly listed companies, and is in line with Bedard
et al. (2008).
Klein (2002) and Bedard et al. (2004) indicate that audit committee independence
reduces earnings management. Abbott et al. (2004) find a negative association between
audit committee independence and the likelihood of financial reporting restatement
and financial reporting fraud. Persons (2005) also provides evidence to support the
view that independent audit committees contribute positively to the financial reporting
process, by showing that the likelihood of financial statement fraud is lower when the
audit committee is comprised solely of independent directors.
Felo et al. (2003) find a positive relationship between financial reporting quality and
audit committee size in a univariate analysis but this relationship does not hold in the
multivariate analysis. Lin et al. (2006) provide evidence which suggests a negative
association between the size of audit committee and the occurrence of earnings
management.
Another audit committee attribute that has been widely examined is financial
expertise. Abbott et al. (2004) and Bedard et al. (2004) suggest that audit committee
financial expertise reduces financial restatements or earnings management. DeFond et al.
(2005) argue that appointment of accounting financial experts generates a positive stock
market reaction which suggests that the market believes that the specialised skills
possessed by accounting financial experts are useful in executing their role as financial
monitors. Zhang et al. (2007) find that companies are more likely to be identified with
internal control weaknesses, if their audit committees have less-financial expertise or,
more specifically, have less-accounting financial expertise and non-accounting financial
expertise; this is consistent with prior evidence by Krishnan (2005). However, in a more
recent study in Canada, Bedard et al. (2008) find no significant association between audit
committee attributes (i.e. independence and having expertise in financial matters) and
forecast accuracy.
Based on the evidence to date, we predict that the accuracy of earnings forecasts
positively correlate with the effectiveness of boards and audit committees, and thus
arrive at the following research proposition:
P1.The accuracy of earnings forecasts is greater in IPO companies with a properly
structured audit committee and board of directors.
3. Methods
3.1 Measure of forecast accuracy
Following Bamber and Cheon (1998) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), management
earnings forecasts were chosen to examine the relationship between governance and
financial disclosure quality. This paper used forecast accuracy to proxy for disclosure
quality. Forecast accuracy is measured by the AFE, so greater accuracy corresponds to
a smaller AFE. In a formula form, forecast error (FE) is written as:
FE ¼ Ai;T 2 Fi;TjFi;T j
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where, FE is forecast error, Ai,T is actual earnings of company i for period T, Fi,T is
forecast earnings of company i for period T. Thus, the AFE is measured as the absolute
difference between the actual earnings and the forecast earnings deflated by the absolute
forecast earnings[2]. If the management of the IPO company makes an accurate forecast,
the mean AFEs should be lower in value and not be significantly different from zero.
Prior studies (Williams, 1996; Tan et al., 2002; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) suggest
that the accuracy of management earnings forecasts gives an indication of the credibility
of management.
Earnings forecast is considered biased if the actual earnings are systematically over
or under the forecasted earnings. Forecasts are optimistically biased if forecast earnings
are greater than actual earnings (FE is less than 0). On the other hand, if forecast earnings
are lower than actual earnings (FE is more than 0), these forecasts are conservative or
pessimistically biased. Jaggi et al. (2006) argue that managers tend to issue more optimistic
forecasts to obtain higher offering proceeds.
3.2 Measure of factors influencing the accuracy of earnings forecasts
We perform a multivariate analysis to identify factors that may influence financial
disclosure quality. The level of AFE is regressed on variables relating to board and audit
committee characteristics and on five additional control variables: auditor reputation,
company size, earnings reduction, forecasts horizon and company age. Our selection of
potential control variables is guided by prior Malaysian evidence (Jelic et al., 1998) and
other studies on IPO earnings forecasts accuracy. We use the ordinary least squares
(OLS) multiple regression model as follows:
AFEi ¼ a 0 þ b1INED þ b2BDSIZE þ b3ACNED þ b4ACSIZE þ b5PFMSHIP
þ b6AUDITOR þ b7COSIZE þ b8EARNRED þ b9FHORIZON
þ b10AGE þ 1i
where:
AFE ¼ the absolute difference between actual earnings and the earnings
forecasts deflated by absolute earnings forecasts.
INED ¼ percentage of independent non-executive directors on board.
BDSIZE ¼ total number of directors on the board.
ACNED ¼ percentage of non-executive directors on audit committee.
ACSIZE ¼ total number of directors in audit committee.
PFMSHIP ¼ dummy variable of “1” if at least one member of audit committee
possesses professional accounting qualification and “0” otherwise.
AUDITOR ¼ dummy variable of “1” if auditor is Big4/5 (Arthur
Andersen, DeloitteKassimChan, Ernst and Young, KPMG,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, or their pre-merger equivalents) and “0”
otherwise.
COSIZE ¼ company size, measured by ln total assets, at the date of prospectus.
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EARNRED ¼ dummy variable of “1” if company experienced a reduction in
earnings a year prior to the IPO and “0” otherwise.
FHORIZON ¼ forecast horizon, measure by the number of months from the
management forecast date to end of the period for which the
forecast is made.
AGE ¼ company age, measured by ln (1 þ number of years between
incorporation[3] and the IPO date).
1i ¼ error terms.
The additional five variables have all been identified in previous studies as being likely
to influence the level of forecasts accuracy. Auditors play a significant role in validating
the prospective financial information made by the IPO management at the time of public
offerings. The approved auditing standard “The Examination of Prospective Financial
Information” stipulates that the auditor should not accept, or should withdraw from,
an engagement when the assumptions accompanying the forecasts are clearly
unrealistic or when the auditor believes that the prospective financial information will be
inappropriate for its intended use (Para 11, AI 3400). Cormier and Martinez (2006) and
Lee et al. (2006) suggest that higher quality auditing is associated with greater earnings
forecasts accuracy. This leads to an expectation that reputable auditors (BIG4/5) will
encourage IPO companies to provide more accurate earnings forecasts. Therefore, we
hypothesise a positive relationship between auditor reputation and financial disclosure
quality (i.e. a negative relationship between auditor reputation and AFEs).
Jelic et al. (1998) argue that the larger the company, the more stable the company
earnings and the more accurate earnings forecasts made by the managers. Thus,
a negative relationship is expected between company size and the level of AFEs.
However, Firth and Smith (1992) and Chan et al. (1996) find the reverse. Firth and Smith
(1992) argue that larger companies raise more capital than their smaller counterparts,
therefore their forecast is more difficult to make and less accurate. Thus, we expect that
relationship between company size and forecast accuracy can operate in both directions.
Studies by Capstaff et al. (1995) and Jelic et al. (1998) show that earnings forecasts
made by analysts and management are more inaccurate for companies that experience a
reduction in earnings. Hence, we expect the accuracy of IPO earnings forecasts to be less
reliable for companies that exhibit an earnings reduction prior to IPO, than for their
counterparts that register an earnings increase.
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Chin et al. (2006) argue that the earlier the forecast
is made (the greater the number of days from the forecast date to the end of the financial
reporting date) the less accurate it will be due to the greater uncertainty regarding actual
earnings. Therefore, we include the forecast horizon variable to control for forecast
accuracy.
Given that historical data are important inputs into the forecasting process, previous
studies postulate that the longer a company has been in existence, the greater the
forecasting accuracy, as it is extremely difficult to predict the earnings of companies
with little or no prior operating history. Therefore, we predict that forecast accuracy
improves the longer the company has been in existence.
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4. Sample selection and data
Data on corporate board and audit committee characteristics were hand-collected from
the offering prospectuses under the section “corporate information” and cross-checked
with the “director, senior management and employee” section. Data for management
earnings forecasts, auditor, company size, earnings reduction, forecast horizon, company
age, and other company characteristics were also collected from the offering prospectuses.
Data on the actual earnings were obtained from the first-published annual reports. Care
was taken in collecting the data on earnings forecasts and actual earnings to ensure
consistency. For example, data on earnings forecasts were collected first with its
corresponding earnings forecast type (e.g. profit before tax, profit before tax and minority
interest, or profit after tax). Then, the same type of earnings data were collected from the
first published annual report. This avoids errors in the measurement of forecast accuracy
and also in the interpretation of the results (Dev and Webb, 1972; Jelic et al., 1998).
For the sample, companies listed on the Main and Second Boards of Bursa Malaysia
during the period 1999-2006 were initially considered. The list of industry types was
obtained from the Bursa Malaysia web site. In total, 253 companies were listed on both
boards. As with Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), the sample excludes financial companies
(consisting of four finance companies, seven real estate investment trusts and one
closed-end funds companies) due to their different regulatory requirements governing
their practices on disclosure. Following Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007), two companies listed
via introduction and four infrastructure project companies were also excluded. The final
sample consists of 235 IPOs (93 per cent of the total population) that made management
earnings forecasts during the period 1999-2006. Of the 235 IPOs, eight companies are
from the construction sector, 58 companies are from the consumer product sector,
98 companies are from the industrial products sector, 14 companies are from the
properties sector, seven companies are from the plantation sector, three companies are
from the technology sector and 47 companies are from the trading/services sector.
5. Results
5.1 Composition of companies
Table I presents a distribution of our sample by year of going public (1999-2006) and
listing board (Main and Second Boards). Main Board companies consist of 38.3 per cent
Main Board Second Board
IPO year n % n % Total %
1999 9 10.00 10 6.90 19 8.09
2000 12 13.33 26 17.93 38 16.17
2001 5 5.56 14 9.66 19 8.09
2002 21 23.33 22 15.17 43 18.30
2003 13 14.44 22 15.17 35 14.89
2004 15 16.67 26 17.93 41 17.45
2005 9 10.00 17 11.72 26 11.06
2006 6 6.67 8 5.52 14 5.96
Total number of sample (%) 90 100 145 100 235 100
Note: This table reports the distribution of 235 IPOs by year of going public (1999-2006) and board of
listing (Main and Second Boards)
Table I.
Distribution of IPO
sample by year and
board of listings
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of the sample while Second Board companies make up the balance of 61.7 per cent.
The highest number of IPOs seeking a listing on the Main and the Second Board
occurred in 2002 (43 companies) while the lowest occurred in 2006 (14 companies).
5.2 Descriptive statistics
Table II presents the descriptive statistics of our company attributes for the full sample
of 235 IPO companies. The data are also separated into the Main Board (90 companies)
and the Second Board (145 companies). Focusing first on the full sample, the results
show that both the mean and median FE is negative,23.50 per cent and21.86 per cent,
respectively. The mean FE is not statistically different from zero but the median value
is statistically significant at 5 per cent level ( p-value ¼ 0.016). The results demonstrate
that, on average, the management of IPO companies during the period 1999-2006 have
made optimistically biased forecasts, indicated by the negative sign of FEs. As also
reported in row 3 of Panel A, the percentage of IPO companies that made conservative
forecasts is slightly lower than 50 per cent. The overestimation in forecast can be
explained by the fact that the economic conditions of our sample period (1999-2006)
included a recovery after the economic stress experienced in 1997 and 1998. Our results
are in contrast to those of Mohamad et al. (1994) and Jelic et al. (1998) who found the mean
FE of þ9.34 per cent and þ33.37 per cent, respectively. The highest negative FE
(minimum) is reported at2270.47 per cent while the highest positive FE (maximum) is
451.29 per cent.
Owing to the fact that outliers exist in the data set, we truncate the data to remove
them. As argued by Jelic et al. (1998), this procedure is common practice in the literature.
We exclude 21 companies having extreme outliers (outside the range of ^3 times the
inter-quartile range beyond the upper and lower quartiles) that may distort the results on
means FEs. After removing these outlier companies, the mean and median FEs
are23.49 and 0.16 per cent, respectively. The mean FE is now statistically significant
from zero at 1 per cent level but median value remains significant at 5 per cent level.
However, we do not find any significant differences in FEs between companies listed on
the Main and the Second Boards.
The mean and median AFEs are 23.76 and 9.14 per cent, respectively. Both the mean
and median AFEs are significantly different from zero. After removing the outlier
companies, not reported in the table, the mean and median AFEs are also statistically
significant from zero with values of 13.62 and 8.40 per cent, respectively. Interestingly,
our results demonstrate that, on average, earning forecasts made by the management
of Malaysian IPO companies are outside the range of ^10 per cent limit imposed by
regulators[4]. As reported in row 4 of Panel A, only 56.6 per cent of our sample IPO
companies had met the Bursa Malaysia earning forecasts threshold. Nevertheless,
the results of absolute forecasts errors found in our study are lower than the results
of 54.91 per cent for mean and 12.1 per cent for median observed by Jelic et al. (1998).
In addition, the mean AFE observed in our study is also lower than the results of
27.91 per cent observed by Mohamad et al. (1994). Our results indicate that IPOs in our
sample period exhibit greater forecast accuracy than IPOs in earlier periods. Similar to
the results observed for the FEs, we do not find any significant differences in AFEs
between Main and Second Boards IPO companies.
The average percentage of NEDs on the board is 52 per cent, with Main Board companies
showing a significantly higher average than the Second Board companies (55 vs 52 per cent).
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Out of 52 per cent of NEDs, 35 per cent of them are independent directors. Some IPO
companies in the sample have less than one third independent directors in their boards. For
the full sample, board size ranges from 4 to 16 with a mean of eight directors. As for the audit
committee composition, the size ranges from three to five, with a mean and median of three.
All the audit committees in our sample have majority NEDs. The mean and median
proportion of independent NEDs in audit committees is about two-thirds. On average,
71 per cent of the sample companies have at least one member of their audit committees
possessing professional memberships either in local or international accounting bodies.
As expected, Main Board companies are more established than their counterparts in
the Second Board. This is reflected in the mean and median differences in firm age
measured from incorporation to prospectus date, which are significantly higher for Main
than Second Boards companies. For the full sample, the forecast horizon (i.e. the number
of months between the prospectus date and the end of forecast period) ranges from three
to 15 months, with a mean of eight months. The pre-IPO shareholders in the sample, on
average, retained 75 per cent of their holdings. On average, IPO companies in the Main
Board are five and four times larger than IPO companies in the Second Board in terms
of total assets and turnover, respectively.
As for the choice of IPO advisers, Main Board companies are more likely to engage
BIG4/5 firms of accountants and prestigious underwriters than are Second Board
companies. Finally, almost one-fifth of the companies in the sample reported an earnings
decline prior to IPO. The incidence of earnings decline is more prevalent among Main
Board IPOs than Second Board IPOs (30 vs 19 per cent).
In order to clearly identify the number of companies in each FE category, we report
the distribution of FEs in 10 per cent bands in Table III. It shows that out of 235 IPO
companies, 133 sample companies (56.6 per cent) meet the regulatory limit within
the ^10 per cent range required by IPO regulators in Malaysia[4]. On the other hand,
43.4 per cent of the companies in our sample had FEs outside the 10 per cent tolerance
level. This percentage is 10 per cent lower than what was observed by Jelic et al. (1998) in
their study on earnings forecast accuracy on Malaysian Main Board IPOs during the
period 1984-1995.
5.3 Analysis of association of corporate governance attributes and earnings forecast
accuracy in IPOs
We perform multivariate analysis to consider factors that may influence the financial
disclosure quality (i.e. the forecasts accuracy). In particular, we regress the level of AFEs
with board and audit committee variables, and several additional control variables
identified in Section 3. The number of samples in the regression is less than 235 after
removing extreme outliers (21 companies) and companies without detailed information
on corporate directorships (three companies).
Our bivariate correlation analysis reported in Table IV shows moderate correlations
between board size (BDSIZE) and number of INED, and between audit committee size
(ACSIZE) and number of audit committee NEDS (ACNED), with correlations of20.350
and 0.353, respectively. However, none of the other independent variables has high
correlations, which suggests multicollinearity is not likely to be an issue in our
regression models.
Table V presents results of White’s (1980) adjusted OLS regressions addressing the
link between IPO earnings forecast accuracy and corporate governance characteristics.
ARA
18,1
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To investigate the existence of multicollinearity in the estimation of the relation between
corporate governance and management earnings forecasts, the variance inflation factors
(VIFs) for each of the independent variables are computed. Consistent with the previous
correlation matrix, VIFs for the governance variables as reported in column 2 of Table V
are always below 2.0, suggesting that multicollinearity is not likely to be a major factor
driving our results.
We report four regression model results in Table V. The results of the first regression
model (Model 1), which consider all boards and audit committees, and other control
variables are reported in columns 4 and 5. We find that the AFE significantly declines
(at 5 per cent level) with a higher percentage of NEDs in audit committee. Our results
suggest that the higher the percentage of NEDs in the audit committee, the more accurate
are the earnings forecasts in the IPO prospectuses. We also find that the AFE has a
negative relationship with size of audit committees, suggesting that audit committees with
more members make more accurate forecasts. Our results are consistent with those of
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) that suggest good corporate governance is associated with
greater financial disclosure quality. Results on control variables suggest that management
forecasts are more accurate only after controlling for company size. We find that the larger
the IPO company, the greater the FEs and the lower the financial disclosure quality. Our
results are consistent with Firth and Smith (1992), suggesting that larger companies raise
more capital than their smaller counterparts making it more difficult to forecast future
earnings accurately.
To gain further insight on which characteristics (either of boards or audit
committees) have greater influence on earnings forecasts accuracy, we perform
Forecast error (%) Number of companies
.100 4
90 to 100 1
80 to 90 0
70 to 80 2
60 to 70 1
50 to 60 1
40 to 50 0
30 to 40 6
20 to 30 11
10 to 20 16
0 to 10 74
21 to 210 59
211 to 220 12
220 to 230 10
230 to 240 11
240 to 250 12
250 to 260 1
260 to 270 3
270 to 280 3
280 to 290 4
290 to 2100 1
,2100 3
Total number of sample 235
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additional regressions. Our second model (Model 2) only includes board characteristics
and control variables, while our third model (Model 3) only includes audit committee
characteristics and control variables. Focusing first on the results of Model 2, our results
confirm that none of our board characteristics has a significant influence on the accuracy
of earnings forecasts in IPO companies. Interestingly, BIG4/5 auditor has a significant
negative relationship (at 10 per cent level) with AFEs. Our results suggest that higher
quality auditors do play a role in increasing the accuracy of earnings forecasts. Company
size continues to be influential but the level of significance has reduced to 5 per cent.
Similar to the results observed in Model 1, when we include only audit committee
characteristics and other control variables in our Model 3, we find that only the audit
committee non-executive director variable (ACNED) has a significant negative
relationship (at 10 per cent level) with AFEs. Audit committee size is no longer a major
determinant of earnings forecasts accuracy but still in the expected sign (i.e. negative).
Similar to the results of Model 2, auditor reputation has a significant influence on
earnings forecasts accuracy. Company size continues to be significant at the 1 per cent
level. Other control variables in our model do not show any significant association with
earnings forecasts accuracy.
Owing to the fact that board characteristics and the rest of control variables are not
the main factors influencing the accuracy of earnings forecasts in our Models 1-3, we then
perform additional regression by excluding them in our Model 4. The results are
reported in the last two columns of Table V. We find that all of the variables identified in
Model 4 with the exception of audit committee size variable are found to influence the
earnings forecasts accuracy.
As a whole, our results suggest that smaller companies with properly structured
audit committees and more reputable auditors have lower FEs, which indicate greater
financial disclosure quality.
6. Conclusion
This paper examines the association between the board of directors, the audit committee
and the accuracy of management earnings forecasts. We find that effective audit
committees with a larger membership and a higher proportion of NEDs are related to
greater forecast accuracy. This finding is similar to the work undertaken by Karamanou
and Vafeas (2005), suggesting that effective governance is associated with high-quality
information flowing from management to investors. However, no evidence is found
linking audit committee financial expertise and independence of the full board with the
accuracy of management earnings forecasts in IPOs.
In sum, the results of this paper demonstrate the vital responsibility of audit
committees and external auditors in improving financial disclosure practices. These
results are also consistent with decisions made by Malaysian regulators such as the SC to
enhance the quality of financial disclosure by revising the Malaysian Code on Corporate
Governance to encourage public companies to implement good governance practices.
Owing to the fact that professional membership of the audit committee does not play
a significant role in monitoring the quality of the information contained in the IPO
prospectus, we suggest that future research should investigate further the specific
characteristics of the audit committee in terms of their academic qualifications and
working experience in accounting or other related fields. These characteristics might
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18,1
64
provide further insight into factors affecting the quality of financial disclosure and could
have direct implications for further improvement in corporate governance.
It would also be interesting to investigate what explanations have been provided in
their first published annual reports by the management of Malaysian IPO companies
when the earnings forecasts made in their IPO prospectuses have deviated outside
the ^10 per cent limit imposed in Para. 9.19 (33) of the Bursa Malaysia Listing
Requirements.
Notes
1. Forecast error and forecast accuracy will be used interchangeably throughout this paper.
A lower forecast error indicates greater accuracy.
2. There are two companies with negative forecast earnings in our sample. We use the absolute
value of forecast earnings as the denominator to avoid miscalculation of forecasts errors due
to negative value of the denominator.
3. In Malaysia, it is common for a new unlisted public company to be established prior to IPO,
whereby the new unlisted public company acquired several private companies in order to
meet the minimum listing requirements. In our study, the incorporation date used is based
on the date when the new unlisted public company is incorporated.
4. Para. 9.19 (33) of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement stipulates that in the case of any
deviation of 10 per cent or more between (1) the profit after tax and minority interest stated in a
profit estimate, forecast or projection previously announced or disclosed in a public document
and (2) the announced unaudited accounts, an explanation of the deviation and reconciliation
thereof should be disclosed in the annual reports. However, in this study, we compare forecast
earnings with audited earnings, not the unaudited earnings in the preliminary announcement.
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